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Collective Bargaining in Context




This book is an analysis of the relationship among collective bar-
gaining, firm competitiveness, and employment protection/creation in
the United States. Collective bargaining, at its essence, is the determi-
nation of terms and conditions of employment through negotiation
between an employer and a representative of the employer’s employ-
ees acting collectively as a group; hence the term collective bargaining.
Although collective bargaining is generally contrasted with individual
bargaining, for the vast majority of employees in the United States, the
alternative to collective bargaining is unilateral determination of terms
and conditions of employment by the employer, with perhaps a small
zone of negotiations over wages or salaries and/or job duties. 
Few institutions in the United States generate as much continuing
controversy as collective bargaining. Any attempt to change the laws
surrounding collective bargaining brings out waves of lobbyists, often
attempting to invoke deep value-laden arguments to advocate or
oppose legislative changes that serve or disserve the interests of unions
and employers (Block 1997). For those who favor collective bargain-
ing, unions and collective bargaining are an indispensable element of a
democratic society. Unionism and collective bargaining provide indus-
trial democracy, a means by which employees have a voice in their
workplace lives. Only through the power associated with collective
representation can employees make that voice heard. They argue that
to be effective, such collective representation requires, at times, a will-
ingness to subordinate the interests of the individual worker to the
interests of the collectivity of workers. They would disagree that
unions and collective bargaining impair economic efficiency, arguing
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that in some circumstances unions enhance efficiency, and that the the-
oretical inefficiency argument incorporates a set of competitiveness
assumptions that rarely hold. Moreover, proponents of collective bar-
gaining would argue that even if unions impair economic efficiency, it
is only short-run impairment that disappears after employers make
adjustments in employment practices and production processes in
response to unionism (Block 1995). 
On the other hand, while those on the other side of the debate do
not, in principle, oppose voluntary unionism, they would argue, as
noted, that legally protected unionism and collective bargaining result
in economic and political distortions that are inconsistent with effi-
ciency and democracy. Collective bargaining, it is argued, gives dis-
proportionate labor market power to employees, resulting in higher
wages to unionized workers (e.g., supercompetitive wages) than they
would receive in a competitive labor market in the absence of collec-
tive bargaining. Unionism also results in lower employment in the
unionized sector than would otherwise occur, as the high unionized
wages and terms and conditions of employment discourage employers
from hiring workers. This low employment in the unionized sector
causes unemployed workers to shift to the non-union sector, resulting
in excess labor supply and lower wages for those workers. Thus, as
compared to a competitive labor market, the distortionary effects asso-
ciated with collective bargaining include lower employment for union-
ized workers, lower wages for nonunion workers, lower profits for
shareholders, and less investment and economic growth. 
Politically, to the extent that unionism requires the subordination
of the interests of individual employees to a larger group, or collectiv-
ity of employees, it can be seen as inconsistent with individual rights.
In addition, by forcing employers to negotiate with the employees’ rep-
resentative over matters affecting employment, collective bargaining
impairs the property rights of employers to allocate their resources in
the way that they see fit. 
Despite concerns raised by skeptics of unionism and collective bar-
gaining, all developed, industrialized, democratic countries have cre-
ated collective bargaining systems (U.S. Department of State 1999).
The values underlying these systems, however, differ across countries,
reflecting, to a greater or lesser extent, the views expressed above.
Although this book focuses solely on collective bargaining in the
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United States, in a world of globalization, a complete understanding of
the U.S. collective bargaining system involves placing the system in a
worldwide context. This is best done by comparing the values underly-
ing the collective bargaining system in the United States with values
underlying the collective bargaining systems in other industrialized
countries; we discuss this in the next section of this chapter. The fol-
lowing section undertakes a similar examination of Europe as an exam-
ple of industrialized democracies with collective bargaining systems
exhibiting a different set of values. The final section provides a sum-
mary. 
VALUES AND EMPLOYMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
As noted, collective bargaining may be defined as the establish-
ment of terms and conditions of the employment relationship through
negotiation between an employer and a (legally recognized) represen-
tative of the employer’s employees acting collectively as a group.
There are two key elements to collective bargaining: the collectiviza-
tion of employees and the employment relationship. In the United
States, both of these elements are associated with certain values, pre-
mises, or assumptions that determine the status of collective bargain-
ing. These values and assumptions are so ingrained in U.S. culture that
it may be difficult to recognize them as values or assumptions that may
not be universally accepted. Nevertheless, they do define how collec-
tive bargaining is viewed in the United States. Each of these elements
will be examined through the lens of values. 
Collectivism and the Employment Relationship
In the United States, a very high value has traditionally been
placed on individualism. Indeed, as has been observed in a study of
individualism and life in the United States, “individualism lies at the
very core of American culture” (Bellah et al. 1987, p. 142).
In the context of collectivizing the employment relationship, the
primacy of individualism means that the rights of individuals are gen-
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erally superior to other rights, and that individual rights take prece-
dence over other rights when there is a perceived conflict. 
American culture views the exercise of property rights as a direct
derivative of individual rights. The basic principle is that individuals
should be free to use and dispose of their property as they see fit, so
long as no laws are violated. In other words, freedom of contract is
highly valued. Individuals should be free to pursue their economic
interests, generally free from restraints.1
While one can readily conceive of people possessing individual
rights, corporations have generally been viewed as legal individuals,
with, for the most part, the same panoply of individual rights possessed
by persons. Thus, corporations, which are fundamentally voluntary
collectivities of shareholders, may pursue their individual (corporate)
interests with the same vigor as persons.
As a result, the terms and conditions of the typical employment
relationship are established by the agreement of two individuals, the
employee and the corporation/employer, each exercising individual
rights to obtain a mutually agreeable bargain that is in their respective
interests, although neither party can include terms or conditions of
employment that are illegal. Indeed, this individual determination of
the terms and conditions of employment is the “default” or “normal”
process in the United States for establishing the terms and conditions
of employment. 
Operating in such a milieu, unions, as collectivities of employees,
are at a cultural disadvantage. Collectively determined terms and con-
ditions of employment are considered the exception to the “normal”
process of individual determination. Collectivization occurs only if a
majority of the employees in unit decide to collectivize the relationship
through the established legal procedures. Even if the employees decide
to collectivize, the choice may be rescinded at appropriate times (Har-
din and Higgins 2001). 
Over the years, there has been a great deal of legal debate and posi-
tioning, both legislatively and before legal tribunals, regarding the
proper scope of collective activity. This is because in order to act as an
effective collectivity and as a representative of all employees, a union
must necessarily aggregate the interests of all employees into a unified
position. This aggregation means that some employees may view
themselves as disadvantaged vis-à-vis the terms and conditions of
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employment (that are perceived to be) available to them in the absence
of collectivization. The point is that on occasion, the union must subor-
dinate the interests of the individual to the interests of larger group. In
addition, because of an obligation to negotiate with a union, the collec-
tive bargaining process places constraints on employer use of its prop-
erty.
The result is that unionism and collective bargaining often conflict
with two legal principles: individual employee rights and employer
property rights. With respect to individual employee rights, although
unions have been granted some privileges to pursue collective inter-
ests, there are some constraints on union behavior in circumstances in
which such behavior may be viewed as being inconsistent with individ-
ual rights, as U.S. labor policy attempts to find a balance between col-
lective action and individual rights that is consistent with its values.
Thus, on the collectivity end of the continuum, a union, when chosen
as the legal bargaining representative, represents all employees in the
unit, and no employee may agree with the employer on terms and con-
ditions of employment that are inconsistent with those on which the
employer and the union have agreed. The union and the employer are
also authorized to negotiate a union security clause, by which the
employee must become a union member or at least pay dues and fees
equal to those paid by a member. A union may also compel a member
to follow its internal rules, including rules associated with working
during a duly authorized strike. 
On the individualism end of the continuum, as noted, a union shop
provision may not compel union membership and adherence to the
union’s internal rules; it may compel only monetary payments. More-
over, those payments may be reduced by an amount that goes to politi-
cal or non–collective bargaining activities of the union. Finally, states
have the right to prohibit such provisions. Unions may not limit the
rights of persons to resign from the union, thus constraining the extent
to which working during a strike can be restrained. Unions may not use
dues and fees collected under a union security clause for political pur-
poses, as such use might be viewed as inconsistent with the employee’s
freedom of speech and association.
The conflict between employee collective activity and employer
property rights has also been an attempt to strike a proper balance. On
the employee collectivity end of the continuum, employees have the
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right to engage in organizational activity at the workplace on nonwork
time, and the employer must negotiate over terms and conditions of
employment with a union representing the employees. On the property
rights end of the continuum, the employer may generally prohibit a
union (distinct from employees) from organizing on its property and
may oppose a union organizational attempt by legal means. An
employer may also make major changes in the structure of its business
without negotiating with the union over those changes. 
The Employment Relationship
In the United States, the employment relationship has always been
viewed as primarily an economic transaction rather than a relationship
that incorporates social content. This view is exemplified by the adher-
ence of the United States to the doctrine of employment-at-will: as a
general principle, either party can terminate the employment relation-
ship at any time. In other words, the employment relationship is value-
based; it exists only so long as that relationship creates sufficient value
for both the employer and the employee. When the value created is
insufficient for just one of the parties, the relationship can be termi-
nated with no required notice.2
It is also telling that there are few legal or societal requirements
associated with the level of terms and conditions of employment. With
the exception of the substantive requirements to pay a minimum wage
and overtime for certain employees who work more than 40 hours in a
week or 80 hours over two weeks, the bulk of U.S. employment policy,
embodied in law, generally addresses only discrimination and differen-
tial treatment as between groups of employees viewed as being favored
and employees in “protected groups.” Thus, there is no law requiring
that employers provide health insurance for employees. But the law
does prohibit employers who choose to provide health insurance from
providing greater levels of coverage for males than for females, for
example. The law does not state the wage the employer must pay, but
the law prohibits an employer from paying female employees less than
male employees, and vice versa.3
This principle of nondiscrimination is consistent with the values
the United States places on individualism and productivity. As a gen-
eral rule, employees should be hired and rewarded based not on immu-
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table characteristics, but rather on business considerations and the
value they create. Thus, employment policy is not truly designed to
address social concerns. Rather, it is designed to ensure that the labor
market functions efficiently, with employment-related decisions based
on productivity rather than personal characteristics unrelated to value. 
VALUES AND EMPLOYMENT IN EUROPE
With a market that rivals the size of the United States, the Euro-
pean Union (EU) is a dominant force in the global economy. More-
over, with the recent monetary union and eventual expansion into
eastern Europe in the next five years, the EU will play an increasingly
important role in the industrialized economies. As a confederation of
nations, the political and regulatory frameworks within the EU differ
across countries. Some countries reflect market liberalism and a lais-
sez-faire approach to regulation, while others emphasize a collectivist
or corporatist approach to policy (Leat 1998). Despite these differences
in regulatory orientation, the European Commission has actively
sought to harmonize labor standards across member states. Harmoniz-
ing labor standards through the policy-making process and the binding
directives from the European Commission have a significant impact on
the rights of employees on issues of participation, employment secu-
rity, and collective bargaining across European countries. Moreover,
the values behind these standards reflect a different approach to collec-
tivism and individualism and the employment relationship when com-
pared with the United States. In this section, we contrast the values in
Europe regarding collectivism and the employment relationship with
those of the United States discussed previously. 
Collectivism and the Employment Relationship
In the United States, individual employees are given the right to
form a labor union or collective body to represent them at the work-
place. The existence of labor unions comes from the desire of individu-
als who vote to form or disband them. Labor unions have no legal
status at the workplace apart from that given to them by individual
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employees. In addition, their role in society is largely economic. They
represent workers in their negotiations with companies about wages
and working conditions. 
Although labor unions engage in political activity in the United
States, they are viewed no differently in the political process than any
other interest group. Labor unions in the United States are not given
special roles in policy making and are not perceived as serving a social
function.
In contrast, collective organizations in Europe are afforded rights
apart from individuals and are given explicit roles as representative
organizations in EU policy making. In Germany, they are given rights
in the constitution to exist and carry out activities that serve their
underlying purposes (Berghahn and Karsten 1987). In addition, labor
unions across Europe do not have to win elections in order to exist or
negotiate with management. Labor unions in many European countries
often negotiate with employer associations in centralized bargaining
structures where contracts are extended to workers in all firms within
the employer association. Labor unions in some European countries
serve quasi-public roles. For example, in Sweden and Belgium, labor
unions manage the unemployment insurance system (Visser 1996). In
France, labor unions manage a number of social security funds, includ-
ing unemployment benefits and work accident insurance (Graham
2000). Moreover, in Germany, labor unions participate with employer
associations in determining the curriculum for various occupations in
the German system of vocational training (Berg 1994). 
Reflecting the role played by labor unions and employer associa-
tions within member countries, the EU has integrated the input of labor
and employer peak associations into the policy-making structure of the
EU. Prior to instituting directives, the European Commission consults
with labor and employer representatives in an effort to build consensus.
Social directives that affect the employment relationship, such as
working time or part-time work, will come into effect only after a
negotiated consensus emerges with labor and employer representa-
tives. This approach to policy making reflects the value attached to
consensus, consultation, and corporatism within Europe and the Euro-
pean Union (Sciarra 1999). 
The key point regarding the discussion above reflects the funda-
mental differences in the views of unionism between the United States
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and the EU. Whereas labor unions in the United States are viewed as
having a strictly economic function, labor unions and employer associ-
ations in Europe are commonly referred to as social partners. These
partners are engaged in a social dialogue within a social market econ-
omy. The word partners implies equality between labor and employers
in the employment relationship. While the bargaining power between
the two may not always be equal, the term social partners describes
how both labor and employers are seen as having equal legitimacy
within the society. The explicit recognition that the European economy
is a social market economy rather than simply a market economy is
reflective of how the employment relationship is viewed in Europe. 
The Employment Relationship
Unlike the United States, which gives virtually total authority to
property owners or shareholders over business and investment deci-
sions, governments in Europe are much more willing to support the
rights of stakeholders, such as labor unions and workers, to a say in
business and employment-related decisions. For example, in Germany
employees have the opportunity to elect a works council that has rights
to information, consultation, and codetermination on various employ-
ment-related issues. Management must consult with works councils on
issues regarding personnel planning, such as implementing new tech-
nology or changing the organization of work. However, on issues of
pay schemes or work schedules, management and the works council
must codetermine the policy. Similar rights of participation exist in the
Netherlands, Sweden, Belgium, France, Denmark, Austria, and Swit-
zerland.
Recognizing that these national rights to participation and consul-
tation can be diminished in a global economy where relevant corporate
decisions fall outside their jurisdiction, the EU implemented a Euro-
pean-wide works council directive in 1994 and later extended its cov-
erage to include more countries in 1997. The European Works
Councils (EWCs) are established within large, multinational compa-
nies operating in Europe. These councils do not give employees or
trade unions the same extensive rights to codetermination enjoyed by
workers in national legislation. Instead, EWCs’ main objective is to
provide employees with information and allow for consultation with
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management. The establishment of EWCs by the EU illustrates its will-
ingness to support the rights of stakeholders to have a voice in the
employment relationship between workers and companies operating in
Europe. The European Works Council Directive also shows the types
of labor and social standards the EU wants to harmonize across coun-
tries. With monetary union bringing countries closer together, greater
harmonization of labor and social standards is likely to follow. 
The EU is also strengthening the role of collective bargaining in
the implementation of European legislation. European Union directives
often use collective bargaining as an instrument of flexibility. Direc-
tives regarding health and safety and working time use collective bar-
gaining as a means of negotiating flexibility into broad multinational
legislation (Veneziani 1999). 
SUMMARY
Rather than provide the reader with a full description of collective
bargaining in the United States, the discussion in this chapter is
intended to demonstrate that the assumptions underlying work,
employment, and employee collectivism in the United States are value-
based conceptions of employment rather than universally recognized
truths. United States culture values individualism, property rights, and
a transaction view of employment, and that is reflected in American
conceptions of employment and the narrow and circumspect role of
collective bargaining and unionism in the employment relations sys-
tem. On the other hand, European culture values collectivism more
than the United States culture, and Europe is more willing than the
United States to see employment as having a social purpose as well as
an economic purpose. Thus, unions and collective bargaining play a
much greater role in the European employment system than in the
United States employment system.
Thus, as one reads the case studies in this volume, one should
understand that they reflect the U.S. collective bargaining system and
U.S. conceptions of employment. Moreover, we will better understand
the collective bargaining system in the United States when we realize
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that there are other systems in industrialized democracies with a differ-
ent set of values and assumptions. 
Notes
This research was supported in part by the International Labor Organization under con-
tract no. 5453. The views expressed in this book are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the International Labor Organization.
1. Freedom of contract is limited, as there are some “contracts” that the United
States has determined are sufficiently undesirable as to be unlawful. Thus, an
employer and an employee may not agree to pay a wage below the legal mini-
mum, even if the employee would accept such a wage. 
2. In economic terms, the value of the employment relationship will be sufficient for
the employer to maintain it when the employee’s marginal revenue product, the
additional revenue produced from an additional unit (hour) of that employee’s
labor is at least sufficient to cover the employee’s compensation. For the
employee, the value of the employment relationship will be sufficient to maintain
it when the employee’s compensation is at least equal to his or her reservation
wage, or the minimum level of compensation the employee must receive to keep
the job. The reservation wage is influenced by such factors as fixed expenses
associated with employment (e.g., commuting, child care) and by the wage rate
the employee could obtain with another employer. 
3. In contrast, there is no law prohibiting employers from discriminating against
workers on the basis of employment status. Thus, full- and part-time workers per-
forming the same work can be paid differently. 
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